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Abstract 
Religious fundamentalism is associated with Christian-Islamic conflicts 
globally, but the psychological reasons remain unexplored. Here, we show that 
fundamentalism is detrimental to inter-religious relations because it makes 
Christians and Muslims alike reject common theological grounds and 
Abrahamic origins. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrated that such dual 
Abrahamic categories mediated the negative effects of fundamentalism on real 
monetary donations to out-group children desperately in need (i.e., Save the 
Children Syria) among Christians, but not Atheists.  Importantly, this was the 
case only to the degree that Syrian children were perceived as Muslims and, 
hence, part of an Abrahamic out-group.  Using a double-randomized 
experimental design, Study 2 demonstrated the causal effects of religious 
fundamentalism on Abrahamic categorization and of Abrahamic categorization 
on mutual resource distribution bias among Muslims and Christians. Together, 
these studies suggest that religious fundamentalism fuels inter-religious 
conflicts because it crucially impacts basic categorization processes, with 
subsequent negative effects on intergroup relations. 
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Religious fundamentalism regularly surfaces in public discourse on 
conflicts of both inter- and intranational scale, such as wars on terror, conflicts in 
the Middle East, or tense intergroup relations in multicultural societies. 
Although religious fundamentalism is often portrayed as confined to Muslims 
and the Islamic world, it can be found in virtually any religion (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992). Irrespective of their specific religious denomination, 
fundamentalists differ from their moderate religious peers in holding particularly 
preclusive religious conceptions, believing is a single right way to salvation that 
has to be followed rigidly (Altemeyer, 2003). Possibly to defend their stolid 
ideological stance (Brandt & Reyna, 2010), individuals high on religious 
fundamentalism tend to hold negative attitudes towards dissentients (Hall, Matz, 
& Wood, 2010). Indeed, fundamentalist notions have repeatedly been used to 
justify extreme acts of violence towards other groups (Emerson & Hartman, 
2006), including the 12
th
-century crusades, atrocities as between Christians and 
Muslims in Nigeria, or terroristic mass murder, most recently as conducted by 
Christian fundamentalist Anders Behring Breivik. 
Here, we propose that religious fundamentalism is particularly derogative 
for Christian-Islamic relations because it leads Muslims and Christians to 
overlook blatant theological commonalities between their religions, reinforcing 
the division between “us” and “them” that has detrimental effects on intergroup 
relations, as demonstrated by decades of work within the social identity tradition 
(Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Yet, although often ignored in public 
discourse and religious education (Plante, 2009), Islam and Christianity are 
theologically related in many ways. Not only do various religious figures, such 
as Moses, Jesus, Noah or Jonah play important roles in both religions, but Islam 
and Christianity also both trace their origins to the progenitor Abraham/Ibrahim. 
Some contemporary religious leaders do recognize this common heritage. For 
instance, King Hussain of Jordan, arguably a descendent of the Prophet 
Mohammed, emphasized the importance to “bring together the Children of 
Abraham” (King Hussein I, 1991), while Pope John Paul II depicted Abraham as 
the “common forefather” in Lisbon in 1982. 
Because such dual categories — notions of a shared, superordinate group 
including the in-group and immediate out-groups in addition to one’s own sub-
group category — generally attenuate intergroup bias (see, e.g., Dovidio, 
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Gaertner, Shnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), here we test if endorsing a common Abrahamic 
group attenuates mutual intergroup bias among Muslims and Christians. 
Crucially, we predict that religious fundamentalism will limit the degree to 
which believers endorse such a dual Abrahamic religious category in the first 
place, precisely because fundamentalism involves a narrow worldview 
(Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005) and a tendency to reject alternative religious 
interpretations (Brandt & Reyna, 2010).  This, we propose, is an underlying, 
mediating process that makes religious fundamentalism fuel hostile group 
relations in many parts of the world. 
In a cross-national context, Study 1 tests whether endorsing the common 
origins of Christianity and Islam mediates the detrimental effects of religious 
fundamentalism on costly, altruistic helping of out-group children in dire need. 
To do so, we gave American workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk an 
unexpected bonus of $1 and the opportunity to donate any or none of this 
amount to Save the Children Syria. In terms of limiting factors, we expected 
dual Abrahamic categorization to mediate the effect of religious fundamentalism 
on aid donations 1) only among Christians because it should be irrelevant for 
Atheists’ self-concepts and 2) only to the degree that Syrians are perceived as 
Muslim, and hence as part of the Abrahamic group. 
In a tense intra-national context, Study 2 tests the full causal chain of our 
proposed meditational model among Muslims and Christians in Germany using 
a double-randomized approach (see MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; 
Sherman & Gorkin, 1980).  Specifically we test 1) if manipulating the saliency 
of religious fundamentalism causes dual Abrahamic categorization to change 
and 2) if manipulating dual Abrahamic categorization causes reduced mutual 
bias in Tajfel-like resource distribution scenarios, and leads to more positive 
feelings towards Abrahamic, but not non-Abrahamic, out-groups. 
 
Study 1 
Material and Methods 
Participants. As no comparable studies were available to gather 
information about the expectable effect size, we conducted power analyses for a 
small effect (f
2
= .10) in regression-based analyses. Results indicated that n = 124 
5 
 
 
would be needed to have at least an 80% chance to observe such an effect with a 
significance criterion of .05. This sample size would also meet the criteria of 100 
to 150 participants suggested by Wang and Wang (2012) and a rule of thumb 
ratio of 10-20 participants per variable (see Tanaka, 1987). Although no 
information is available about the religious affiliation of workers on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, we, based on census data, expected most MTurkers to identify 
as Christians, followed by Atheists and followers of other faiths. In order to 
ensure that we would meet the minimum sample for both Christians and Atheists, 
we collected data from all in all 400 participants through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Of these participants, 179 were Christians, 134 Atheists and 87 identified 
with other religious affiliations. Due to the purpose of our study, only Christian 
and Atheist participants were retained for analyses (Mage= 34.36, SDage = 11.82; 
males = 60.4%).  
 
Procedure and Measures. Respondents were paid 70 cents for 
participating in a study on “social issues”. They first answered questions 
assessing religious fundamentalism as well as strength of religious identification 
in randomized order, as subgroup identification has been found to negatively 
predict common categorizations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) so that religious 
identification is an important control variable. Next, participants answered a 
measure assessing dual Abrahamic categorization and were then given the 
opportunity to donate all or none of a surprise $1 bonus to Save the Children 
Syria before answering demographic questions
1
. Unless stated otherwise, all 
responses were scored on 7-point Likert scales with 1 (totally disagree) and 7 
(totally agree) as endpoints. All analyses were run with SPSS 21 and the 
PROCESS regression macros (Hayes, 2013). 
 
Religious fundamentalism. The revised religious fundamentalism scale 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) was used to measure fundamentalist beliefs (α 
= .97). The scale consists of 12 items, such as “To lead the best, most 
meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion” or 
“God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, 
which must be totally followed.” 
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Religious identification. We used an adapted version of the collective 
self-esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) to measure religious identification 
(α = .94). Participants indicated their agreement with four items such as “The 
religion I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.” 
 
Dual Abrahamic categorization. We wrote four items to reflect the dual 
identity conceptionalization of Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy (2007). 
Specifically, participants indicated their agreement with the statements “Because 
Abraham is the progenitor of both Islam and Christianity, one can say that 
Muslims and Christians belong to the same ‘family’ of religions”, “Christians as 
well as Muslims believe in an Abrahamic religion”, “Christianity and Islam have 
common roots” and “Even though Islam and Christianity are different religions, 
both belong to the same group of religions”, forming a reliable scale (α = .93). 
 
Donation task. Participants read information about the conflict in Syria 
adapted from the Save the Children Syria webpage. Next, they were told that 
they had received a payment bonus of $1 and asked if they would like to donate 
any given amount between 0 and 100 cents (using a sliding response scale): 
“4 million Syrian children are suffering as a result of a horrific conflict – 
one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time – which is now stretching into 
its third year. Two million people have fled to neighboring countries Iraq, 
Lebanon and Jordan, but many more remain in dire need of assistance. Save the 
Children Syria is on the ground helping to keep children safe, providing the 
basics they need, like food and blankets and offering programs to help them 
cope with tragedy. We grant you a 1 dollar bonus for your participation in our 
study. How much of this bonus would you like to donate to Save the Children 
Syria?” 
At the very end of the study, after answering demographic questions, we 
asked participants to indicate the percentage of the Syrian population they 
believed to be Muslim: “How many percent of the Syrian population do you 
think is Muslim? (Please do not use the internet to find the right answer, we are 
only interested in your own, rough estimate.)” This was done to assess the 
degree to which participants indeed perceived Syrians as a Muslim, hence 
Abrahamic, out-group. 
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Results 
While participants in total donated 116.69$ out of 398$ to Save the 
Children Syria, Christians donated significantly more (M = 34.62 cents, SD = 
39.44) than Atheists (M = 20.73 cents, SD = 30.79; t(310.43) = -3.49, p = .001, 
η2 = .04). Also, the donation variable was positively skewed only among 
Atheists (skewness = 1.49) but not among Christians (skewness = 0.69). 
We conducted second-stage moderated mediation analyses (Edwards & 
Lambert, 2007), with religious fundamentalism as predictor variable, dual 
Abrahamic categorization as mediator, donation as dependent variable and 
percentage of Syrians perceived to be Muslim as moderator of the relation 
between dual Abrahamic categorization and donation (see Figure 1). As the 
distinction between Christians and Atheists is central to the hypotheses of the 
study, the analyses were run separately for both groups. Religious identification, 
which was positively related to religious fundamentalism (r = .80, p < .001), 
negatively related to dual Abrahamic categorization (r = -.34, p < .001) and was 
unrelated to the remaining variables (.574 < ps < .581), was controlled for as 
covariate in each stage of the analyses. 
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The results supported our hypotheses. To start with, religious 
fundamentalism was related to less dual Abrahamic categorization in the first 
regression for both groups while religious identification remained insignificant 
as predictor (see Table 1). However, supporting the first limiting factor, the 
degree to which participants perceived Syrians as a Muslim out-group 
moderated the relationship between dual Abrahamic categorization and donation 
among Christians but not among Atheists for whom Abrahamic categorization 
does not affect the definition of their group. Specifically, the moderated 
regression part of the mediational chain and, most importantly, the interaction 
term between dual Abrahamic categorization and percentage of Syrians 
perceived to be Muslim were significant only among Christians (see Table 2). 
Put differently, as expected, dual Abrahamic categorization was unrelated to 
donation among Atheists. 
Also our second limiting factor obtained support. Following up on the 
significant moderation among Christians, analyses of the conditional effects 
showed that dual Abrahamic categorization lead to more donations only among 
participants who perceived most Syrians to be Muslim, scoring one standard 
deviation above the mean on the percentage variable and, hence, saw the 
donation as clearly supporting an Abrahamic out-group (see Figure 2). No such 
effect was observed for scores on the mean or one standard deviation below the 
mean on the percentage variable. Consistent with this finding, bias-corrected 
bootstrapping with 5000 bootstrap resamples confirmed that religious 
fundamentalism had an indirect negative effect on donation that was mediated 
by dual Abrahamic categorization only when participants perceived Syrians as 
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predominantly being Muslim (B =  -2.70,  SE = 1.59, 95% CI [-6.36, -.04]), but 
not when this perception was moderate (B =  -.40,  SE = 1.06, 95% CI [-2.64, 
1.65]) or low (B =  1.90, SE = 1.34, 95% CI [-.25, 5.16]). 
Because our moderated mediational model was based on cross-sectional 
data, it was important also to test the most plausible alternative model, namely a 
model in which dual Abrahamic categorization is the predictor and religious 
fundamentalism the mediating variable. In this model, dual Abrahamic 
categorization predicted religious fundamentalism only weakly in the first 
regression (β = -.19, SE = .05, p < .001, F (2, 176) = 207.37, p < .001, R2 = .70), 
while the control variable religious identification emerged as main predictor (β 
= .76, SE = .04, p < .001). Crucially, in the moderated regression part (F (5, 176) 
= 2.59, p = .28, R
2 
= .07) the interaction term between religious fundamentalism 
and percentage of Syrians perceived to be Muslims (β = -.07, SE = .08, p = .696) 
as well as all remaining predictors (.118 < ps < .711) were insignificant giving 
support of our hypothesized model in favor of this alternative model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simple slopes for mean donations towards Save the Children Syria regressed on 
interaction between dual Abrahamic categorization and perception of Syrians being Muslims in 
Study 1. 
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Study 2 
Material and Methods 
Participants. Because parts of the analyses involved multi-group 
structural equation modelling, we aimed at recruiting between 100 and 150 
participants per group as has been suggested as minimum sample size (see Wang 
& Wang, 2012). In total, 288 participants from Germany (141 Christians and 
147 Muslims) were recruited through advertisement on online social networks 
and webpages relevant to our study on “interreligious issues”, satisfying this 
sample size criterion in both groups. The majority of participants consisted of 
young adults (Mage = 24.27, SDage = 7.41) and were male (63.9%).  
 
Procedure and Measures. As part of the double-randomized 
experimental design, participants consecutively went through a religious 
fundamentalism manipulation and a categorization manipulation: 
 
Religious fundamentalism manipulation. In the first part of the 
experiment, we used an order-manipulation of religious fundamentalism akin to 
Jost and Kay (2005) to alter the salience of religious fundamentalism. This type 
of manipulation can be used to activate mental constructs, increasing their 
accessibility (Schwartz, Bless, Wänke, & Winkielman, 2003), with subsequent 
effects on causally related constructs. Specifically, participants were assigned to 
a religious fundamentalism protrait, contrait or control group. In the protrait 
condition, participants indicated their agreement with five items
3
 from the scale 
used in Study 1, for which higher agreement represents more religious 
fundamentalism (e.g., “The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be 
tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs.”) In the contrait condition, 
participants indicated their agreement with five reversed items from the same 
scale, for which agreement represents less religious fundamentalism (e.g., “All 
of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no 
perfectly true, right religion.”) In the control condition, no items were presented. 
Many competing theories have attempted to explain how such salience 
manipulations affect behavior, and uncertainty about the underlying process 
remains, where “one of the most critical is the question of how to predict what 
type of effect will emerge from any single priming event” (Loersch & Payne, 
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2011, p. 235). Indeed, it is not unusual that the same manipulations have 
different, sometimes opposing, effects (see Bargh, 2006 for a review). Therefore, 
this control group was crucial to determine whether respondents would 
assimilate to the items presented (e.g., by showing less endorsement of a dual 
Abrahamic categorization when primed with protrait fundamentalism items) or 
contrast to the items (e.g., by showing more endorsement of a dual Abrahamic 
categorization when primed with contrait religious fundamentalism items). 
In each condition, participants were then asked to indicate their 
agreement with the dual Abrahamic categorization measure (α = .86) from Study 
1 and to complete a Tajfel-like resource allocation task adopted from Sidanius, 
Haley, Molina, and Pratto (2007)
4
. This task tested the degree to which they 
maximized relative difference between the in-group and the out-group, even at 
the expense of absolute in-group gains. That is, was maintaining a relative bias 
that benefitted the in-group over the out-group so important for participants that 
they would even pay for it by accepting lower absolute gains? Specifically, 
participants had to choose one of seven alternative ways to distribute an 
unspecified sum of money between Christian and Islamic social organizations 
for the elderly.  Here, a value of 1 (i.e., “190 000€ for [in-group: either Christian 
or Muslim] organizations and 250 000€ for [out-group: either Christian or 
Muslim] organizations”) represents a preference for absolute in-group gain, 
while 4 (i.e., “130 000€ for [in-group] and 130 000€ for [out-group] 
organizations”) represents equal distribution between both groups, and a value of 
7 (i.e., “70 000€ for [in-group] organizations and 10 000€ for [out-group] 
organizations”) represents maximum in-group gain relative to the out-group. In 
other words, the higher individuals scored on this measure, the more they 
prioritized giving their group more money relative to the out-group, even when 
this meant that their group would receive less money in absolute terms.  
 
Categorization manipulation.  Next, individuals were once again 
randomly assigned to one of three categorization conditions, namely a separate 
groups condition, a dual Abrahamic group condition or a control condition: 
● In the separate groups condition, respondents first read a text 
emphasizing theological differences, presented on three separate pages which 
12 
 
 
participants had to click through to ensure that they actually read and not simply 
skipped the text: 
“When one reads both the Bible and the Qur’an, one realizes that Islam 
and Christianity are two very different religions. In Christianity, Jesus is not 
only the son of God, but God himself. This is not the case in Islam where Jesus 
is just one of many prophets. In Islam, the last Prophet is Mohammed, who is 
not even part of Christianity. Also in terms of celebrations and traditions, 
Christians and Muslims are very different. While Christians celebrate the birth 
of Jesus, Muslims celebrate the feast of sacrifice during the Haddsch. 
Concluding, one can say that Islam and Christianity are very different religious 
groups, since Muslims and Christians believe in different things.” 
After reading the text, participants in this group were asked to categorize 
themselves as Christian, Muslim or atheist.  
● In the dual Abrahamic group condition, individuals first read a text, 
again divided on three pages, describing theological commonalities that make 
both Islam and Christianity being Abrahamic religions: 
“Many Christians and Muslims have forgotten the commonalities 
between their religions. For instance, both Islam and Christianity refer to the 
common progenitor Abraham and to the fact that he only believed in one god. 
This god, Christians and Muslims still believe in today. Also the Qur’an and 
Bible have many commonalities. In both books, Adam is described as the first 
human who had to flee from paradise. Moreover, figures such as Jesus, Moses, 
Noah, Ismael, Jakob, David and Jonah play important roles in both religions. 
Due to these various commonalities, both religions belong to the group of 
Abrahamic religions.” 
After reading the text, participants were asked to categorize themselves 
as Abrahamic-Christian, Abrahamic-Muslim, or atheist.  
● In the control condition, participants neither read a text nor were asked 
to categorize themselves. 
Following each experimental condition, respondents completed a second 
resource allocation task equal to the one described earlier, with the difference 
that the target groups this time constituted Christian/Muslim youth clubs. In 
addition, they were asked to rate their feelings towards the Abrahamic out-group 
(i.e., Muslims or Christians) and towards a range of non-Abrahamic groups (i.e., 
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Hindus, Buddhists, Atheists and Scientologists). Here, to reduce response 
variations due to cultural differences between the study groups, feelings were 
measured on a low level of abstraction (see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992) using a 
feeling thermometer adopted from Verkuyten (2007). Specifically, participants 
were asked to rate their feelings towards each group with “0” representing very 
cold or negative feelings and “100” representing very warm or positive feelings. 
Importantly, for both the resource distribution task and the feeling thermometer, 
in the control and separate group condition, the in- and out-groups simply were 
termed Muslims or Christians, whereas they were explicitly named Abrahamic-
Muslims and Abrahamic-Christians in the dual Abrahamic group condition to 
underline their fellow group membership. At the end of the study, participants 
answered demographical questions regarding their age, gender and religious 
affiliation.  
 
Results  
The causal effect of manipulating the salience of religious 
fundamentalism on dual Abrahamic categorization. Testing the first causal 
leg of our mediational model, a 3 (religious fundamentalism saliency condition: 
Contrait, Protrait, Control) x 2 (religious group: Muslims, Christians) ANOVA 
with dual Abrahamic categorization as dependent variable and age and gender as 
covariates indicated a significant main effect of the saliency manipulation, F(2, 
287) = 5.88, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .04; a significant effect of the religious group 
variable with Muslims showing generally higher degrees of dual Abrahamic 
categorization, F(1, 287) = 25.93, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .09; and a significant 
interaction between the saliency manipulation and religious group, F(2, 287) = 
4.45, p = .012, ηp
2 
= .03.  
As predicted, the experimental manipulations of religious 
fundamentalism caused congruent changes in dual Abrahamic categorization. An 
inspection of the error bars in Figure 3 suggested that, due to a decrease in the 
salience of religious fundamentalism, participants in the protrait condition 
endorsed dual Abrahamic categorization to a greater extent (M = 4.54, SE = .14) 
than in the contrait condition (M = 3.90, SE = .14, p = .001) regardless of their 
religious denomination. However, for whatever reasons, the baseline religious 
fundamentalism differed between the two religious groups as indicated by the  
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Figure 3. Effects of religious fundamentalism (RF) salience manipulation on dual Abrahamic 
Categorization (DAC) in Study 2 among Muslims and Christians. 
 
agreement with dual Abrahamic categorization among participants in the control 
condition who had not answered to any RF items. Consequently, we constructed  
a new experimental dummy variable with 0 constituting anti-fundamentalism 
(i.e., the protrait condition) and 1 constituting pro-fundamentalism (i.e., the 
contrait condition) that consistently resulted in lower dual Abrahamic 
categorization in both groups.   
As no direct effects of the experimental conditions were observed for the 
first distribution task (t(185) = .34, p = .737), multi-group path analyses in 
AMOS 21 was used to test a model with the manifest experimental dummy 
variable as predictor, the manifest dual Abrahamic categorization variable as 
mediator and the manifest resource distribution task as dependent variable.  A 
version of the model with constrained structural weights obtained a very close fit 
to the data, χ2(4, 187) = 1.36, p = .851, RMSEA < .001 (90 % CI [<.001, .061]; 
PCLOSE: p = .928),  CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.15. Importantly and further 
underlining the universality of the relations across the samples, no significant 
model-fit differences were observed between the constrained and an 
unconstrained version of the model, Δχ2 < 0.00, Δdf = 1, p = .999. Hence, as the 
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relationships tested in the model were invariant across the religious groups, the 
constrained model was estimated. As displayed in Figure 4, across the groups, 
the religious fundamentalism saliency condition negatively predicted dual 
Abrahamic categorization (B = -.63, SE = .19; Muslims: β = -.22, p < .001; 
Christians:  β = -.26, p < .001) which in turn negatively related to bias in the first 
resource distribution task (B = -.44, SE = .10; Muslims: β = -.33, p < .001; 
Christians:  β = -.33, p < .001).  Bootstrapping with 5000 bootstrap resamples 
showed that the resulting indirect effect was significant (B = .52, SE = .03, β 
= .09, p < .001, 95% CI [.033, .158]). 
 
 
 
The effect of dual Abrahamic categorization on resource distribution 
bias. Inspection of the error bars in Figure 5 showed that the separate group 
condition increased group bias in the second resource distribution task compared 
to the control group, while the dual Abrahamic categorization condition reduced 
bias, such that the separate and dual Abrahamic group conditions differed 
significantly from each other. Consequently, we conducted a 2 (experimental 
condition: separate group, dual Abrahamic group) x 2 (religious group: Muslims, 
Christians) MANOVA with all bias measures as dependent variables.  We found 
two main effects across the bias variables: 
1) Muslims generally displayed less bias towards the Abrahamic out-
group than did Christians, F(6, 175) =  16.35, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .35, and 
2) as predicted, participants who recategorized themselves into a dual 
Abrahamic group showed less bias, F(6, 175) =  2.37, p = .031, ηp
2 
= .08. An 
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insignificant interaction term between religious group and the recategorization 
manipulation, F(6, 175) =  .81, p = .564, demonstrated that this pattern did not 
differ across the two religious groups and an additional MANOVA showed that 
the recateogrization manipulation did no interact with the preceeding religious 
fundmantentalism manipulation, F(6, 109) =  1.28, p = .273. 
Specifically, the between-subjects effects showed that, after 
recategorization into a dual Abrahamic group, participants showed less resource 
distribution bias on the second resource distribution taks (M = 4.01, SE = .17) 
than those in the separate group condition (M = 4.58, SE = .16; F(1, 184) =  6.11, 
p = .014, ηp
2 
= .03). Moreover, they also showed more positive feelings towards 
the Abrahamic out-group (M = 64.61, SE = 2.73) than their peers in the separate 
group condition (M = 51.88, SE = 2.63; F(1, 184) =  11.26, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .06). 
Last, again demonstrating the limiting factor that dual Abrahamic categorization 
only reduces bias towards Abrahamic out-groups, no other significant effects 
were observed for feelings towards the remaining non-Abrahamic out-groups 
(.177 < ps < .607). 
 
 
Figure 5. Difference between categorization conditions in Study 2 are displayed. Significance 
estimates are based on MANOVA results. 
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General Discussion 
Two studies, applying different methodological approaches and using 
samples from different cultures and cross-national and intra-national contexts, 
showed that religious fundamentalism leads Christian and Muslim believers 
alike to reject dual group categorization despite of obvious common theological 
grounds. This is unfortunate, because dual Abrahamic categorization, in turn and 
in accord with previous research on common and dual group categorizations 
(e.g., Dovidio et al., 2007; Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009), consistently led to 
less bias towards the Abrahamic out-group in terms of real monetary donations 
to out-group children desperately in need, resource distribution scenarios and 
intergroup feelings. 
Yet, although dual Abrahamic categorization emerges here as a 
promising construct for Christian-Muslim relations, two caveats have to be 
mentioned: First and as predicted, dual Abrahamic categorization had no effect 
on group bias among Atheists for whom dual Abrahamic categorization should 
be irrelevant for their self-concepts and simply represent knowledge about 
Abrahamic groups. Second, although dual categorization led to less group bias 
among believers as predicted, it did so only when the out-group was seen as part 
of the relevant Abrahamic group. Hence, dual Abrahamic categorization seems 
to leave general religious tolerance unaffected.  
While religious fundamentalism has been associated with conflicts 
between religious groups in many parts of the world (Emerson & Hartman, 
2006), little has been known about the underlying psychological mechanisms of 
this relationship. The present paper suggests that one central reason for why 
religious fundamentalism is particularly destructive for inter-religious relations 
is that it literally divides religious groups, making believers think less in terms of 
theological commonalities and more in terms of theological differences, 
reinforcing social psychological divisions a lá “us vs them”. 
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Footnotes 
1
http://www.savethechildren.org/site/c.8rKLIXMGIpI4E/b.7998857/k.D075/Syria.htm 
2
An emotion measure that also was part of the original survey is not presented here 
due to reasons of brevity and the behavioral focus of the study.
 
3
Two items of the religious fundamentalism scale that dealt with theologically variant 
constructs such as Satan were excluded. 
4
Participants also responded to a stereotypes and emotions measure which we, 
however, chose not to elaborate on because we were primarily interested in behavioral aspects 
of intergroup bias. 
 
 
 
 
